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A ”chain of replacement” model is used to examine the eﬀects of
automobile taxes and of a scrappage premium on the life length of
c a r s ,a n do nt h es i z eo ft h ec a rﬂeet. The predictions of the model
are tested on data on the scrappage of cars in Sweden 1989-2002. The
theoretical model predicts that increased taxes on the purchase of cars
should increase the life length of cars, and reduce the number of cars.
A scrappage premium would have the opposite eﬀects. Changes in
periodic taxes would have no eﬀect on the life length of automobiles,
but would reduce the size of the car stock. The econometric analysis
indicates, however, that the eﬀe c t sb o t ho nt h el i f e - l e n g t ho fc a r s ,a n d
o nt h es i z eo ft h ec a rp a r ca r es m a l l .O nt h eb a s i so ft h ec o n c l u s i o n s
from the theoretical and the empirical analysis, the possible implica-
tions of the European Union’s Directive 2000/53/EC on end-of life
vehicles (ELV) are discussed.
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11 Introduction
Automobiles causes environmental problems when they are built, when they
are used, and when they are disposed oﬀ. Policies that reduce the negative en-
vironmental impact from an automobile during one part of its life-cycle may
increase the environmental harm caused during other parts of this life-cycle.
An example of this has to do with changes in the life-length of automobiles.
On the one hand, the pollution connected to the production of new cars,
and the disposal of old cars, will be smaller the longer each car is used. On
the other hand, new cars pollute considerably less than old cars. Per dis-
tance driven, a gasoline powered automobile from 1996 emits less than half
as much as does a 1988 automobile, in respect of all but two of the fourteen
most important emission components.[15] In addition, emissions from a given
car may increase with its age as pollution reduction equipment wears down,
and the general condition of the car deteriorates. Thus, a higher turn-over
rate of the automobile parc may reduce average emissions from cars in use.
New cars are also generally much safer for the driver and the passengers.
The present paper presents a theoretical framework to analyze how vari-
ous policies will aﬀect the life-length of automobiles, as well as on the size of
the automobile parc. An empirical analysis is then performed of the Swedish
system of ”scrappage premiums”. Under this system, a fee is charged on all
new automobiles, which is repaid when the car is scrapped. Thus, the system
may be viewed as a deposit-refund system.
This system may provide lessons with a bearing on the European Union’s
Directive 2000/53/EC on end-of life vehicles (ELV), which aims to mini-
mize and control the environmental hazards from scrapped automobile. At
the same time, the Directive is likely to make the cost of disposing of used
automobiles higher than it would otherwise be. Certainly, the ELV direc-
tive demands that the ”Member States should ensure that the last holder
and/or owner can deliver the end-of life vehicle to an authorized treatment
facility without any cost as a result of the vehicle having no or a negative,
market value.” Also, the Directive introduces so called ”extended producer
responsibility” for automobiles by requiring that ”producers meet all, or a
signiﬁcant part of, the cost of implementing these measures.” However, since
the purpose of the directive is to further ”the fundamental principle that
waste should be reused and recycled”, i.e. stimulate recycling beyond what
is privately proﬁtable, it will lead to added costs. These costs will show up
somewhere, and it is unreasonable to assume that all costs will in the end be
2borne by the producers. Inevitably, a considerable fraction of the cost will
have to be covered by price increases of cars, or in some other fashion that
increases the cost of owning a car. As a consequence, it is conceivable that
car-owners will defer the time at which they buy a new car and dispose of
their old vehicle. To what extent this will happen will partly depend on how
the Directive is implemented by the Member States, which is still an open
question. The Directive give quite a wide scope for the Member States to
adopt diﬀerent regulatory options. Even though the Directive requires im-
plementation of ”free take-back” of ELV:s for all new vehicles sold from July
1, 2002, this provision has not been implemented in all Member States. In
fact, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers Association only
in four countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway (which,
though not a EU member, is bound by the EES Treaty to follow the Direc-
tive), are ”free take-back” oﬀered to owners of ELV:s. In Denmark, it costs
money to dispose of an ELV, but owners are oﬀered an economic compensa-
tion if the vehicle is disposed oﬀ properly. While most Member States are
preparing legislation, the implementation process is far from complete.[8]
It appears that three basic approaches have been taken to the ”free take-
back” requirement. One approach, which resembles the Swedish scrappage
premium system, is to collect a fee from car owners, which is used to subsidize
treatment of ELV:s. In the Netherlands, as in Sweden, this fee is collected
from the ﬁrst owner of the car. In Denmark, the system is ﬁnanced via an an-
nual payment which is added to the liability insurance premium. The second
approach, under consideration in France, is to use voluntary agreements with
t h ea u t o m o b i l ei n d u s t r y ,a n dm i n i m i z eg o v e r n m e n ti n t e r v e n t i o n .H o ws u c h
a system would work in practice is unclear. Finally, one approach, which
has been proposed in the UK, is to take a ”company-by-company” approach,
and assign responsibility for recovery of vehicles to each individual producer
or importer. Under such a system, diﬀerent producers could adopt diﬀerent
models to reach the targets.[8],[9]
The Swedish scrappage premium system, which has been in operation
since 1976, has dual objectives. The ﬁrst, and at the outset the only, objective
is to provide an incentive for car owners to dispose of ELV:s properly. At the
time of the introduction of the system, cars disposed in woods and by the
side of roads was a large and growing concern. The second objective, which
was ﬁrst introduced when the system was altered in 1992, was to reduce
the life length of automobiles. At that time, the scrappage premium was
diﬀerentiated, so that cars that had passed the compulsory vehicle inspection
3received a higher premium when scrapped.
Certainly, policies designed to reduce the life-length of automobiles have
been tried in other countries than Sweden. However, most such ”early re-
tirement programs”, ”accelerated scrappage schemes” or ”accelerated vehicle
retirement programs” are of limited duration, and involve the payment of a
ﬁxed sum of money, a scrappage premium, to car owners who decide to scrap
their cars under the duration of the program. This premium is usually not
paid for all cars but only under certain conditions. Such conditions might
include that the car should be above a given age. In many cases, the pre-
mium is tied to the purchase of a new car. This has been the case with the
accelerated scrappage schemes employed in France, Greece, Italy, Spain and
Ireland, but not with the Danish and Norwegian schemes. An additional
motive behind schemes where the premium is tied to the purchase of a new
car has been to stimulate the automobile industry. In France, this was in
fact the main motive for the so called ”Balladurette” and ”Juppette” pro-
grams.1 All European accelerated vehicle retirement programs have been
government ﬁnanced, even though the automobile industry has sometimes
provided additional incentives to consumers who buy new cars. [5],[19]
In the United States, accelerated vehicle retirement programs (AVRP:s)
have been promoted by the EPA as a means for state and local government
and industry to meet requirements under the Clean Air Act.[10] In Delaware,
an AVRP was implemented by the U.S. Generating Company to oﬀset an in-
crease in hydrocarbon emissions caused by transports to a new plant. [3]
Under a consent decree, General Motors has agreed to implement and ﬁ-
nance AVRP:s in Southern California and in Phoenix/Maricopa County in
Arizona.[12]
Several papers analyze the costs and beneﬁts of such policies, or policy
proposals, or examine the factors determining participation in a scrappage
program, by the use of simulation techniques or through econometric analy-
sis. (See e.g. [2], [3] and [11].) Alberini, Harrington and McConnell [3] also
present a theoretical model of the decision to participate in a vehicle scrap-
page program. Another approach to the eﬀects of policy on the life length of
vehicles is presented by Innes.[13] He derives an expression for the optimal
periodic tax (road tax) for cars of diﬀerent ”vintages” when external costs
vary systematically between these, and shows that a scrappage premium that
d e c l i n e sw i t ht h ea g eo ft h ec a rm a yb ea na l t e r n a t i v et oar o a dt a xw h i c h
1Adda and Cooper[1] analyze these programs.
4increases with the age of the car. Bohm [7] oﬀers a thorough theoretical and
empirical analysis of deposit-refund systems.
Unlike previous papers that deal with automobile scrappage, the theo-
retical part of this paper does not focus on the scrappage decision per se.
Rather, we model how the optimal life length of automobiles and the size of
the car ﬂeet is determined by the combination of taxation and a scrappage
premium. This allows us to analyze a broader range of policy issues, and
also to get some insights into the likely long-term eﬀects on emissions from
accelerated scrappage programs. The model presented in Section 2 assumes
an inﬁnite horizon model with certainty, and interprets the problem as a
”chain of replacement” problem. (See e.g. Massé[17].) By allowing individu-
als to diﬀer in their valuation of car ownership, the consumers’ decisions on
whether or not to be car-owners can be studied within the model. Also, since
we do not foucs on temporary programs, such as AVRP:s, the lessons learned
should be relevant to understand the implications of the ELV Directive.
An econometric analysis of the Swedish scrappage premium system is
performed. We analyze the eﬀects of changes of the scrappage premium on
the number of cars that are scrapped and sold as well as on the stock of
automobiles. The results indicate ﬁrst, that the responses to changes are
asymmetric, in the sense that the absolute values of the induced changes
i nt h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e sa r ed i ﬀerent for reductions and increases in the
scrappage premiums. Secondly, while the number of cars sold and scrapped
are aﬀected by changes in the scrappage premium in the short run, there is
no discernible eﬀect on the number of cars and the life length of cars. Thus,
we ﬁnd no evidence indicating that the Swedish scrappage premium system
has been successful in reducing the life length of automobiles, which has been
one of the stated objectives of the policy.
It can be argued that the latter conclusion, together with the theoretical
analysis, provides a general lesson for analyzes of the car market. It seems
that automobiles sales is really not a good measure of the eﬀects of changes
to prices and other variables, since sales will ”over react”. A fall in prices
will lead to an increase in the optimal size of the automobile parc. To adjust
to the new optimal level, car sales may temporarily increase drastically, even
when the underlying change is small. Also, temporary changes that induce
many car owners to scrap their cars, may induce a drastic, but temporary,
increase in car sales. To avoid such pitfalls, it may be preferable to study
how the car stock changes, instead of analyzing changes to sales.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a the-
5oretical model, based on a chain-of-replacement model is presented, and the
implications of the model are analyzed. In particular, we discuss how changes
in various taxes will eﬀect the life-length of vehicles and the optimal size of
the car parc. Eﬀects of temporary and permanent changes are treated. In
section 3, an empirical analysis of the Swedish scrappage premium system
is presented. In section 4 we discuss the policy implications from the theo-
retical and empirical results. In particular, we consider implications for the
implementation of the ELV Directive. Section 5 concludes.
2 A theoretical model
2.1 The chain-of-replacement problem
An automobile is a durable good. Thus, the utility to an individual from
a car will depend on the beneﬁt and cost streams from using the car over
its entire life. In fact, to analyze the consumer’s decisions we also need to
consider that when the car is disposed oﬀ, he will replace the car with a new
car. Thus, we will ﬁrst specify a chain-of-replacement model, and derive the
ﬁrst order condition for the optimal life length of automobiles.2 We then
consider factors that will determine the size of the car park.
Consider an inﬁnitely lived individual j who derives the following instan-
taneous utility from owning an automobile of age t:
uj(t)=αj + s(ζ;t)+L (1)
where s(ζ;t)+L is the net beneﬁtf r o mac a ro fa g et,a n dαj is a taste para-
meter, which is constant over the age of the car, but varies over individuals.
ζ is a parameter determining the rate at which the utility from owning the
car falls with the age of the car. ζ m a yt h u sb ev i e w e da sad e p r e c i a t i o n
parameter. We will assume that ∂s/∂t<0,a n dt h a t∂s/∂ζ < 0.
Assume further that the (exogenous and constant) price of a new car is
p,w h e r ep may include a tax on the sale of cars. Also, in the case with
extended producer responsibility, the price may have to include the costs
for the automobile producer of taking care of the car once it is scrapped.
When the automobile is scrapped, the owner incurs a cost, and may receive
2The problem is formally identical to the problem of determining the optimal rotation
period of an even aged forest stand. Löfgren[16] give an exposition on the debate on the
correct procedure to detemine the optimal rotation period.
6a scrappage premium, with the net value R. R may thus be smaller or greater
than zero. However, we will throughout assume that the cost of scrapping a
car is zero to the car owner, and that R is a non-negative scrappage premium.
Assume a simple utility function, which is linear in income. The net
present value, to individual j, of the utility from owning a car that is bought






−ρt [αj + s(ζ;t)+L]dt + e
−ρTR (2)
where ρ ∈ ]0,1[ is the constant discount rate.
Since the decision problem will be identical every time the car is replaced,
we can immediately conclude that the replacement time must always be the
same. We also recognize that the total net present value of utility to the
consumer from being a car owner will be the same, every time a replacement
takes place. Thus, we may write the total present value utility from being a






1 − e−ρT Bj(T) (4)
This expression deﬁnes a ”chain of replacement” problem.






1 − e−ρT Bj(T) (5)









1 − e−ρT [αj + s(ζ;T)+L − ρR]=0 (6)
which, using (4), may be rewritten as:
ρ[Uj(T)+R]=αj + s(ζ;T)+L (7)
Notice that the left hand side of this expression is the opportunity cost of
waiting with the replacement of the automobile, and that the right hand side
7is the instantaneous utility of car ownership at time T.T h u s , t h e o p t i m a l
replacement time T∗ will be set such as to equalize these two.
If we decompose the integral in (2), solve the parts containing the con-
stants L and αj, and then use (4) to separate out [αj + L]/ρ from Uj (T),w e
see that αj and L cancel out in the ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n ,a n dt h a tw em a y











The optimal replacement time will thus be independent of the individual
speciﬁce ﬀect, αj. Also, we can conclude that a tax, such as a road tax,
that is the same regardless of the age of the car, will not eﬀect the optimal
life-length of the car. (Unless, of course, it is diﬀerentiated on the basis of the
age of the car.) This is not surprising since both αj and L are additive in the
individual’s utility function and are independent of how often the individual
buys a new car. As long as the consumer is a car owner, he will receive the
beneﬁts t r e a mαj + L.
Since the ﬁrst order condition must hold identically, we may totally dif-
ferentiate expression (8) to see how the optimal replacement time will be
aﬀected by policy changes, or other changes, that aﬀe c tt h ep r i c eo ft h ec a r ,
p, the scrappage premium, R, the depreciation parameter, ζ, or the discount




















































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h eﬁrst order condition, (8), to obtain expression (9a).
By assumption, s0 (ζ;T) < 0. The optimal life-length of a car will decrease
if the discount rate increases, since (9a) will always be negative.
Expression (9b) tells us what happens if the depreciation parameter changes.
By assumption ∂s/∂ζ < 0.T h u s ,t h eﬁrst term is negative, and the second
8term is positive, which means that the sum may be positive or negative.
Whether an increase in ζ will prolong or shorten the life of automobiles will
depend on the shape of the function s(ζ;t).I fac h a n g ei nζ mainly aﬀects the
rate of decrease in the value of the car when the age of the car approaches
T, then the ﬁrst term will be relatively large in absolute value. If, on the
other hand, ζ mainly aﬀects the rate of decrease in the value of the car in the
beginning of the car’s life, the second term will dominate. Suppose that ζ is
a measure of the stringency of a compulsory automobile inspection system.
This would primarily aﬀect old cars, and would thus be likely to reduce T.
If, on the other hand, ζ measurs the premium consumers put on owning a
new car, then changes in this parameter will mainly aﬀect the second term.
From a policy point of view, it is perhaps most interesting to know the
eﬀect of taxes and of the scrappage premium. From the ﬁrst order condition,
it should be clear that changes in taxes that aﬀect all automobiles similarly
regardless of their age, such as a uniform road tax, will not aﬀect the optimal
life length of the automobile. From expressions (9c) and (9d), it should be
clear that reduction of a tax on the sale of automobiles will have exactly the
same eﬀect as an increase by the same amount of the scrappage premium.
The reason for this is that given that the consumer is a car owner, the scrap-
page premium will always be received at the same time as the registration
tax is paid, since the consumer will always buy a new car when the old one
is scrapped. Thus, with regard to the life length of automobiles, a positive
permanent scrappage premium is exactly equivalent to a negative registra-
tion tax. Thus, a revenue neutral deposit-refund system, i.e. a system where
the buyer of a car pays a sum which is refunded, with interest, when the car
is scrapped, would reduce the life-length of automobiles.
We now turn to the issue of how the size of the car parc is determined.
To do this, we ﬁrst want to determine under which conditions a consumer
will be a car owner. A consumer will own a car if the utility from doing so
is larger than the utility from not owning a car. Let us normalize by setting
the utility of not owning a car to zero. Thus, consumer j will be a car owner
if:
Uj (T
∗) ≥ 0 (10)














Uj (T)=U (T)+αj/ρ (12)
U (T) is thus the part of utility derived from being a car owner that is com-
mon to all individuals. To obtain the second expression, we use the same
decomposition of expression (2) as above, solve the part containing αj,a n d
are then able to separate out
¡
1 − e−ρT¢
·αj/ρ from the resulting expression.
Note that the second right hand term of expression (12) is equal to the net
present value of an eternal beneﬁt stream with a value equal to the ”taste
factor” in the utility function.
Using (10) and (12) we can write the condition under which individual j
will be a car owner as:
αj ≥− ρU (T
∗) (13)
To go from this expression to an expression for the size of the car park,
we need to make some assumptions about the distribution of the taste pa-
rameter, αj. First, assume that the economy is inhabited by a continuum
of individuals, and normalize their number to one. Assume further that αj
is distributed over these individuals according to an integrable density func-
tion, ψ[αj], such that
R b
a ψ[αj]dαj gives the proportion of individuals with
av a l u eo fαj between a and b. The number of car owners, as a function of




ψ[αj]dαj where A = −ρU (T
∗) (14a)
⇒




−∞ ψ[k]dk is the cumulative distribution of αj. The expres-
sion in (14b) can then be used to analyze how policy changes will aﬀect the















































Thus, we see that an increase in the discount rate reduces the size of the car
parc, as does an increase in the depreciation parameter ζ.T h u s ,w h i l e t h e
eﬀect of changes in the depreciation rate of a car on the optimal life length
of a car will depend on the shape of the function s(ζ;t),t h ee ﬀect on the size
of the number of cars in the economy will be unambiguously negative.
It is also clear that it is now the changes to the price and equivalent
changes to the net present value at the time of the purchase of the automobile
of the scrappage premium that have equivalent eﬀects. Thus, while a revenue
neutral deposit-refund system would have an eﬀect on the optimal life-length
of automobiles, it would not aﬀect the size of the car parc.
From (15e), it is clear that changes that aﬀect the value of owning an
automobile, such as a road tax, will aﬀect the size of the car parc. The
eﬀects of any policy change on the size of the car park will be larger, the
larger is the number of people who are close to being indiﬀerent between
being car owners and not being car owners, i.e. the denser the distribution
ψ is around −ρU (T∗).
2.2 Permanent changes
This far, we have considered changes to the optimal life-length of automo-
biles, and to the optimal size of the car park. However, we cannot always
expect the car parc to change instantaneously as a response to changes in
the optimal level of these two variables.
11If the optimal life length of automobiles decrease, say from T∗ to T∗∗ <
T∗,t h e nt h ea d j u s t m e n tt ot h en e we q u i l i b r i u mm a yt a k ep l a c ea to n c e ,
simply by replacing all automobiles older than T∗∗. If, on the other hand,
the optimal life length increases, so that T∗∗ >T ∗, the adjustment cannot be
instantaneous, since automobiles older than T∗ have already been scrapped,
and cannot be ”unscrapped”. Thus, no cars will be taken out of use during a
period of T∗∗ −T∗,i . e .u n t i lt h eo l d e s tc a r si nt h ec a rp a r ch a v er e a c h e dt h e
new optimal life-length. Since, in the model, the only people who buy new
cars are those who have just scrapped their old car, no new cars will be sold
during this period, unless the optimal size of the car parc has also changed.
If the optimal size of the car parc increases, say from n to n0 >n ,t h i s
implies that the threshold, A from expression (13), has fallen, say from A to
A0 <A , and that some individuals, whose car preference, αj, is such that
A0 ≤ αj <A , will now become automobile owners. Since we have implicitly
assumed that supply is inﬁnitely elastic, these individuals will immediately
buy cars. Naturally, in real life we would not expect the transition to a larger
car parc to be literally instantaneous, but would expect lags, and eﬀects on
the supply side. However, it is reasonable to believe that adjustment would
be rather rapid.
Consider instead a fall in the optimal size of the car parc, say from n to
n00 <n , or equivalently, a rise of the threshold, A,t oA00 >A .C o n s i d e ra n
individual j whose car preference αj, is such that A ≤ αj <A 00,a n dw h o
is thus a car owner previous to the change in A. It is clear that he will not
choose to buy a new car once he discards of his old car. Suppose however,
that he owns a car of age vj <T ∗. Then this car may still have a value to
him. Assuming that there is no second hand market for cars, the value of













j is the optimal age of disposing of the car. It is straight forward to
show that T
∗
j <T ∗. Also, it may be the case that the optimal T
∗
j ≤ vj,i n
which case qj = R, and the optimal choice of individual j,i nt h ea b s e n c eo f
a second hand market, is to scrap the car immediately. However, in the case
that T
∗
j >v j, we would expect individual j to keep the car for a period T
∗
j−vj
after the change in A. Since all individuals with α:s such that A ≤ α <A
will have cars of diﬀerent ages, and will also choose diﬀerent levels for T
∗
,t h e
12time it will take for the car parc to adjust to the new level will depend on the
maximum value for T
∗
j − vj over all individuals with an αj : A ≤ αj <A 00.
From expression (16), it should be clear that all changes to the optimal
size of the car parc will not have an equal eﬀect on the rate of adjustment.
We know from expressions (15c) and (15e) that the change to n∗ from a
increase in p by 1
1−e−ρT will be equivalent to a reduction in L by 1.H o w e v e r ,




Clearly, it is unreasonable to rule out the existence of a second hand
market in cars. To approach the issue of what we may expect if used cars
can be traded, consider an individual k with an αk ≥ A00, i.e. an individual
who will continue to be a car owner, and whose old car has just reached T∗.
The price he would be willing to pay for a car of age vj will be determined






−r(t−vj) [αk + s(ζ;t)+L]dt+e















In other words, the highest price he would be willing to pay for a car of age
vj is the value that equates his utility from buying this car to his utility from
buying a new car. The ﬁrst term of the expression for the price is the utility
from owning a car from age vj until T∗ and the second term, which will be
negative, is the foregone utility from owning an old, instead of a new car.
Note that we have integrated out the individual speciﬁce ﬀect, αk to arrive
at the second expression, justifying the exclusion of αk as an argument.
It is straight forward to show that qk (vj) >q j (αj,v j) for αj <A 00.T h u s ,
t h e r es h o u l db es o m ei n t e r m e d i a t ep r i c ea tw h i c ht r a d ec o u l dt a k ep l a c e .A s
long as there are car-owners whose α <A 00, we should expect that those
whose α ≥ A00 and whose cars reach T∗ would buy used cars from these car
owners, instead of buying new cars. This implies that no car sales will take
place until the car parc has been reduced to its optimal size, and that the
transition to a smaller car parc will be more rapid than if no second hand
trade in cars existed. In fact, we know that the longest it could take is the
time it would have taken to sell n00 − n cars.
132.3 The eﬀect of transitory changes
This far, we have only considered permanent changes to policy. However,
some policy changes have a limited, and known, duration. This is the case,
for example, with the accelerated vehicle retirement programs mentioned
in the introduction. Under the assumptions of the model, all cars with a
market value lower than the temporary scrappage premium will immediately
be scrapped. Thus, such a premium will lead to the accelerated scrappage of
the oldest cars in the car park, since these will have the lowest market value.
Since the premium is, by construction, a temporary measure, it can have
no eﬀect on the size of the car park. Thus, all scrapped cars will instantly
be replaced by new cars. Similarly, the premium will not have any eﬀect
on the optimal life length of automobiles. Therefore, after the temporary
scrappage premium has been abolished, and until the oldest cars that were
not scrapped under the accelerated scrappage program reach their optimal
life length, no cars will be scrapped. Also, unless the premium is introduced
without warning, some car owners will delay scrapping their vehicles.
To establish these claims, we ﬁr s tw a n tt od e t e r m i n ew h a tt h em a r k e t
price will be for an automobile of a given age. The lowest price at which a
consumer would be willing to give up a car of age v would be a price p(v)
that equates his utility from keeping the car until it reaches age T
∗,a n d
his utility from switching cars immediately and receiving p(v). Thus, the






−ρ(t−vj) [αj + s(ζ;t)+L]dt + e












which is identical to expression (17) except that we have no index denoting
individuals on q and v. The reason for this is that, while the value to diﬀerent
consumers was diﬀerent when we discussed policy changes that aﬀected the
equilibrium levels of n and T,t h ev a l u eo fac a ro fa g ev will be the same to
all consumers in the present case.
This price will thus constitute the market price of an automobile of age
v. (Since all consumers have the same valuation, there will however be no
14trade in used cars.) The ﬁrst term is equal to the net present value of the
”individual invariant” utility from the car during the remainder of its life,
while the second term reﬂects the distance in time until the car will be
replaced. It is easy to verify that q(0) = p and that q(T∗)=0 .
Suppose, then, that a temporary scrappage premium equal to R is paid
to all car owners who decide to scrap their cars. Obviously, all cars with
a market price lower than this amount will be scrapped. Car owners who
scrap their cars will immediately buy new cars, since by assumption, the
premium is only temporary and thus does not aﬀect the inequality in (10),
which decides whether or not an individual consumer will be a car owner.
The size of the car stock will be unaltered. By the same reasoning, so will
the optimal life length of automobiles.
Since the market price of an automobile, (18), will be strictly decreasing









. It should be noted that all these cars would have been
scrapped anyway when they reached age T∗. Thus the scrappage premium
will reduce the age of the scrapped vehicles by between 0 years, for cars that
would have been scrapped anyway, at the time the program is introduced,




years. It should also be noted that in this model, no new





years, since all cars that would have been scrapped during that
period have already been replaced by newer automobiles. Obviously, the
number of automobiles that are scrapped will depend on the age distribution
of the car stock.
The reasoning in this section is similar to that of Alberini, Harrington
and McConnell.[3] However, they do not address one issue, which is that
a scrappage program usually cannot be introduced as a complete surprise.
Rather, it will be known to automobile owners well in advance. Thus, they
may either wait with buying a new car, or buy a new car but refrain from
scrapping their old car until they may receive the scrappage premium. In fact,
during the latter half of 1975, before the Swedish scrappage premium was
ﬁrst introduced, on the 1 January 1976, the scrapping of cars declined, thus
3The reader may verify this by taking the ﬁrst derivative of expression (18), inserting
the ﬁrst order condition, (7), and then noting that, by assumption, s0 (t) < 0.
15indicating that some car owners waited to scrap their cars until they could
receive the premium.[7] A similar eﬀect was seen in Denmark. In 1993, the
year before Denmark implemented an accelerated vehicle scrappage program,
the number of scrapped cars declined dramatically. In 1993, only 8 000 cars
were scrapped, which may be compared with the average over the years 1985-
1995 which was 93 000 cars.4
To illustrate why some car owners may delay scrapping their automobiles,
we ﬁrst note that if there is no cost involved in keeping an old car, then no
cars will be scrapped between the announcement of the premium and its
implementation. People who would normally have scrapped their cars would
just buy a new car and keep the old one until they could receive the premium.
Usually, however, some cost would be incurred to store the car and to keep it
in a suﬃciently good condition for it to be eligible for the scrappage program.
Assume that this cost is a constant periodic cost, m. In addition, scrappage
programs usually require that the road tax should have been paid for the car.
Thus, this cost may also have to be included in m. Thus, the cost of keeping








If this amount is smaller than the present value of the scrappage premium,
then it will pay to wait. Thus, if it is known that an accelerated vehicle
retirement program will be implemented at a given date in the future, a car
owner who has a car that reaches its optimal life length r y e a r sb e f o r et h a t























is thus the longest time any car owner will delay the scrap-
ping of an automobile in order to obtain the scrappage premium.
4The number of scrapped cars is calculated as the diﬀerence between the number of
registered cars, and the change in the size of the car stock during a given year. Data were
obtained from the 1989, 1995 and 1996 editions of World Road Statistics[20].
16Naturally, the number of car owners who are going to wait to scrap their
c a rw i l lb el a r g e r ,t h el a r g e ri sr∗. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h en u m b e ro f
delayed scrapped cars will be increasing in the scrappage premium, R,a n d
decreasing in the ”storage cost”, m. If the owner derives some beneﬁts from
owning the car, even after it is older than T∗, then this will also increase the
number of delayed scrapped cars. The total number of delayed scrapped cars
will, naturally, also depend on the age distribution of the car parc.
A temporary scrappage premium will thus have two eﬀects. Firstly, some
automobiles will be scrapped earlier then they would have been in the absence
of the premium, and secondly, some scrapped cars will be delayed by car
owners who would anyway have scrapped their cars in the period between
the announcement of the scrappage program and its implementation. Since
both of these eﬀects depend on the age distribution of the car stock, we
cannot say which eﬀect will dominate. A temporary scrappage premium will
have no eﬀect on the optimal life length of automobiles, or on the size of the
car stock.
3 An empirical illustration
The main purpose of the empirical section of this paper is to examine how
the Swedish car parc has been aﬀected by the Swedish scrappage premium
system. We also include price indexes to attempt to account for changes in
the cost of buying and owning automobiles. Since we are using time series
data, we use a simple ARIMA speciﬁcation for estimation. We begin by
describing the details of the system, then the data, and how the model is
speciﬁed, and ﬁnally the estimation results and interpretations of these.
3.1 The Swedish scrappage premium
The original purpose of the scrappage premium, when it was introduced in
Sweden in 1976, was to give car owners an incentive to dispose of scrapped
automobiles properly. Rusting hulks in woods, in parking lots, etc. were
perceived as a serious problem. The system appears to have achieved this
policy objective reasonably well in the beginning of its operation, but seems
to have been less of a success later on. (See Bohm [7].)
Originally, the premium was SEK 300. This amount was increased to
SEK 500 in 1988. From 1992, a higher premium, of SEK 1 500, was paid
17for cars that had passed a vehicle inspection within 14 months before they
were scrapped. The argument for introducing this higher premium was to
reduce pollution by accelerating the scrappage of old automobiles.[6] In 1994,
the condition for receiving the higher premium was made more stringent, by
requiring that the car should have passed a vehicle inspection within 9 months
before scrappage.[18] In 1998 the higher scrappage premium was abolished.
Since 1998 the system has been altered in several ways. First, when the
diﬀerentiated scrappage premium was abolished, a law on extended producer
responsibility for automobiles came into force, covering all cars registered
from 1998 and onwards, except privately imported cars. The act requires
that producers and professional importers of cars should provide for the last
owner of ELV:s to dispose of the cars without cost, and that they should meet
certain recycling targets. Secondly, in 2001 the ”base” scrappage premium
was raised to SEK 700 both for cars covered and not covered by the extended
producer responsibility. The reason for also giving a premium for cars covered
by the extended producer responsibility is that while the law requires that
the owner should be able to dispose of an ELV free of charge, there may still
be a cost to transport the car to the collection point. Thirdly, also in 2001, for
cars not covered by the extended producer responsibility, a new diﬀerentiated
premium was introduced, of SEK 1200 for cars between 7 and 16 years old,
and SEK 1700 for cars 16 years old or above. Again, the motivation for the
diﬀerentiated premium was to induce early retirement of automobiles.
Even though the nominal level of the scrappage premium has only been
changed a few times, the real value has varied considerably due to inﬂation.
Translated into 2002 currency, the scrappage premium in January 1980 was
around SEK 850.5 Before it was raised in April 1988, the real value had
fallen to around SEK 485. After it was raised, the nominal premium was
SEK 500, which in todays price level would correspond to SEK 780. Thus
the increase in the premium was not enough to fully compensate for inﬂation
since the beginning of the decade. The changes to the system, toghether
with the variations caused by inﬂation, makes it possible to study the eﬀects
of the scrappage premium on the scrappage rate.
5SEK 1 ≈ USD 0.12 ≈ EUR 0.11, as of February 2003.
183.2 The data and the empirical model
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 predicts that the scrappage pre-
mium should have a negative eﬀect on the optimal life-length of automobiles,
and a positive eﬀect on the optimal size of the car stock. However, neither
the optimal life-length of automobiles nor the optimal size of the car stock
are directly observable. What we observe is the actual car stock, and the
number of cars that are sold and scrapped. If the changes to the scrappage
premium aﬀects the car stock, we should be able to identify that eﬀect by
observing changes in the actual car stock. To deduce the eﬀects on the life-
length of cars, however, we need to analyze the two other variables. If the
life-length of cars falls as a result of increases in the scrappage premium, we
would expect both the number of cars scrapped and the sale of new cars to
increase in tandem. Thus, we are going to use all of these three variables as
dependent variables. Data on scrapped cars, registrations of new cars and of
the car stock were obtained from Statistics Sweden.
The theoretical model indicates that the cost of buying and of owning
and running cars, as well as the interest rate, will inﬂuence our variables.
The ﬁrst two of these were constructed from the consumer price indices for
these two groups of goods. However, since the cost of buying a car is bound
to be endogenous, we instrument for this variable, using the producer price
index for the car industry. The indices were obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Interest rates were obtained from the Bank of Sweden, and transformed to
real interest rates using the 12-month-change in the consumer price index.
We also include data on real GDP, to take account of changes to income.
Five diﬀerent variables can to be used to describe the scrappage premium:
one for the ”base” premium, which is paid for any properly scrapped auto-
mobile; one for the scrappage premium paid to automobiles that had passed
vehicle inspection within 9 months before scrappage; one for the premium
for cars that had passed inspection within 14 months before scrappage; one
paid for cars between 7 and 16 years old and one for cars older than 16 years.
However, since the latter two are perfectly collinear, both of these cannot
be included in a regression. There is also severe multi-collinearity between
the four remaining scrappage premium variables. Thus, in our regressions,
w eu s et w ov a r i a b l e s ,o n ef o rt h e” b a s e ”p r e m i u m ,a n do n ef o rt h eh i g h e r
premium, ignoring the changing rules on which cars are eligible for this pre-
mium. Data on the scrappage premiums were obtained from the Swedish car
producers’ and importers’ association. (”Motor Traﬃc in Sweden 2001”.[18])
19All time series are monthly data, except GDP, which is a quarterly series.
Since there is a marked seasonal component in car sales, car scrappage and
the stock of cars, these series were seasonally adjusted, using the ratio to
moving average method. All monetary values were deﬂated using the CPI.
As pointed out above, we would expect the eﬀect of changes to be asym-
metric, in the sense that the actual car stock would adjust quicker to an
increase in the optimal size of the car stock than to a decrease. Also, it
would take longer for the car parc to adjust to an increase in the optimal
life length of cars than to a decrease. To account for this, we include the
absolute value of the scrappage premium variables. If the coeﬃcients on a
variable and on the absolute value of the same variable have the same sign,
then this implies that a positive change to this variable has a larger eﬀect
than a negative change, and vice versa. Theory predicts that we should ex-
pect lags. This is accounted for by including lags of the scrappage premium
variables, and by including autoregressive and moving average terms.
We ignore several complications. Among these are ﬁrst, that we use a
linear model for estimation, while we could have used a more ”structural”
speciﬁcation, based on the theoretical predictions, and secondly, that we only
include lags and absolute values of the scrappage premium variables, and not
for the other variables. The justiﬁcation for both of these simpliﬁcations is
that a more elaborate speciﬁcation would place a heavier demand on the data
than the data set we use would stand for.
3.3 Estimation results
Dickey-Fuller tests were used to test for stationarity of all series. The size
of the car stock, the price index for buying cars, and the GDP variable were
integrated of the second order, and the rest of the series of the ﬁrst order.
Three models were estimated, with respectively, the ﬁrst diﬀerences of car
sales, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the number of cars scrapped and the second
diﬀerence of the car stock as the dependent variables. It seems reasonable
that the stock of cars should be integrated to a higher order than the two
other variables, since the diﬀerence between sold cars and scrapped cars
s h o u l di np r i n c i p l eb ee q u a lt ot h ec h a n g ei nt h ec a rs t o c k . 6 The same
explanatory variables are included in all equations. However, diﬀerent AR
6The diﬀerence between changes in the size of the car parc, on the one hand, and the
diﬀerence between sold and scrapped cars, on the other hand, is due to reporting errors
and ”leakage”, e.g. cars that are deregistred but not properly scrapped.
20and MA terms were included to account for serial correlation in the data.
These were selected on the basis of visual inspection of correlograms for the
residuals. Estimation results are presented below in Tables 1 through 3.
Breusch’s and Godfrey’s Lagrange multiplier test was used to test for
serial correlation. (See e.g. Judge, et al.[14].) This is a test of the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation among the residuals against the compos-
ite alternative hypothesis that the residuals follow a moving average or an
autoregressive form of order P or less. The test was run setting P =1 2 .
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation could not be rejected.7 Still, we
estimate the standard errors using the Newey-West procedure.
The indexes we include to account for the cost of buying and using a car
have the predicted signs in all three regressions, i.e. they both have positive
signs in the regression with the number of scrapped cars as the dependent
variable, and negative signs in the two other regressions. However, only in
one case is the sign signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. (The coeﬃcient on the
cost of owning and running a car, in the regression with the car stock as the
dependent variable, is signiﬁcant at the 10 % level.) Thus, it seems that the
indexes perform poorly. However, since our purpose is to analyze the eﬀects
of the scrappage premium, this is of limited importance. It is possible that
the indexes are too rough measures, and should be replaced by e.g. the cost
of an ”average” car and the price of gasoline, or something of that nature.
However, we do not explore this issue. The GDP variable has a positive and
signiﬁcant (10-percent level) coeﬃcient only in the car-stock regression, and
the interest rate variable is nowhere signiﬁcant.
Since we include both lagged values of the scrappage premium variables,
and the absolute value of the premiums and of their lagged values, we are not
primarily interested in the parameters themselves, but of linear combinations
of these, in all, eight coeﬃcients. To determine the impact of a positive
change in one of the scrappage premium variables, we take the sum of the
coeﬃcients on the premium itself and on the absolute value of the premium,
and to determine the impact of a negative change, we take the diﬀerence
between the two coeﬃcients. To determine what the total impact of a change
i s ,w et a k et h es u mo ft h ec o e ﬃcients on the variable and the lagged variable.
These linear combinations of parameters, for all the three estimated models
are presented in table 4.
7The F-statistics produced were, respectively, 1.57, 1.55 and 1.47, implying that we
cannot reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation at any usual level of signiﬁcance.
21/Tables 1-4 about here./
Let us ﬁr s tl o o ka th o wt h en u m b e ro fs c r a p p e dc a r si sa ﬀected by changes
in the scrappage premium. All scrappage coeﬃcients, except one, are signif-
icant at least at the 1% level of signiﬁcance. (The coeﬃcient on the lagged
value of the ”base” premium is not signiﬁcant.) Looking at the various linear
combinations of coeﬃcients, we see that the eﬀect of changes is asymmet-
ric, in the sense that the magnitude of positive and negative changes diﬀer.
The total impact of an increase to the base premium is more than thirty
times greater in absolute value than the impact of a decrease. The latter
is not even signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r o . T h ei m p a c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
the higher premium is about ﬁve times greater in absolute terms than the
impact of a decrease. For both variables, the total impact is smaller than the
direct impact of a change. Thus, a major part of the eﬀect from changes in
the scrappage premium is to delay or put forward some scrapped cars, but
without any long term eﬀects. All of this is consistent with our expectations.
We also see that the total eﬀect on the number of cars scrapped is larger for
changes in the base premium than for changes in the extra premium.
The results from the regression on car sales show, again, that the reaction
to changes in the scrappage premium is asymmetric. This time, however, it is
w h e nt h ep r e m i u mf a l l st h a tw eg e tt h el a r g e s tc h a n g e si na b s o l u t et e r m s ,b u t
only when we look at the same period eﬀects and the lagged eﬀects separately.
If we consider the total eﬀect of a change, i.e. the sum of contemporaneous
and lagged variables, only an increase in the ”extra” premium has an eﬀect
o ns a l e st h a ti ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while the only signiﬁcant
eﬀect of changes to the base premium is that it shifts sales between periods.
Interestingly, increases in the extra premium reduces sales, which is contrary
to expectations. However, this may not be as strange as it seems. Since the
extra scrappage premium is conditioned upon the age or the condition of the
car it may be viewed as a change to the rate of depreciation of the car at
the end of its life. In our model, it changes the shape of s(ζ;t) for values
of t close to T∗. It is perhaps easiest to understand why that may be the
case under the system as it works after the most recent changes. Under this
system, cars that are older than 7 years receive a higher premium, and cars
that are older than 16 years an even higher premium. Thus, if a car owner
would have scrapped his car just before any of these break points, it will
pay him to postpone scrapping the car. This will tend to increase the life-
length of the car, since some car owners will have an incentive to postpone
the scrapping of their car, but no car owners will have an incentive to bring
22forward scrapping their car. It is likely that especially the 16 year breakpoint
is signiﬁcant. Using a rough measure of the life-length of cars, it turns out to
be almost exactly 16 years, and have been so since the middle of the 1990s.
With the older system, where cars that had passed the mandatory vehicle
inspection were eligible for a higher premium, it is slightly more complicated
to see how this happens, but the mechanism may be similar. Suppose a car
owner considers scrapping a car which is at the present time not eligible for
the higher premium. (I.e. it has passed a vehicle inspection, and is thus legal
to drive, but has not passed inspection within the stipulated time.) If there
is a positive probability that the car will pass the next inspection, suﬃciently
large to justify the cost of keeping the car for another short period of time,
then this consideration may delay scrapping the car. Again, there would be
no oﬀsetting incentive for any car owner to bring forward the scrapping of
their car. Thus, the conditions attached to the higher scrappage premium
may actually serve to increase the average life length of automobiles, contrary
to the objective of the policy. It may appear odd that the number of scrapped
cars still increase when the extra premium is increased. However, that may
be the result of cars that would otherwise have been dumped somewhere
instead of being properly taken care of. An alternative explanation for this
apparent departure from the theoretical predictions is presented in the next
paragraph.
In the regressions with the size of the car stock as the dependent vari-
able, none of the coeﬃcients, separately or in linear combinations, on the
base premium variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent
level of signiﬁcance. A lowering of the extra premium seems only to have a
temporary eﬀect on the car stock, while an increase causes a reduction of the
size of the car stock. Again, this does not seem to be in congruence with the
predictions from the theoretical model. To see how this may be reconciled
with theory, consider a situation where the optimal size of the car stock has
fallen, perhaps due to an increase in the tax on car sales. As we saw above,
w ew o u l dn o te x p e c tt h ea c t u a ls i z eo ft h ec a rp a r ct or e a c hi t so p t i m a ll e v e l
immediately, but rather with a lag, the length of which will depend on the
age composition of the car parc and the distribution in the population of the
parameters αj. But if the extra scrappage premium is raised during the ad-
justment period, the adjustment will happen faster, thus possibly accounting
for the negative eﬀect on the size of the car stock.
234 Policy implications
The eﬀects of policies designed to reduce the negative environmental eﬀects
from automobile use may have undesirable side-eﬀects. One reason for this is
that an automobile give rise to negative eﬀects during all parts of its life-cycle.
Thus, measures that mitigate negative eﬀects during one part of the life-cycle
may increase pollution during some other period in the car’s ”life”. Thus,
we cannot determine whether a policy reduces environmental harm without
considering the eﬀects during the entire life-cycle. In this section, we will
apply the framework presented in the paper to analyze two categories of
policies, ﬁrst, various accelerated vehicle retirement programs, and secondly,
the diverse policies designed to implement the ELV directive.
The stated objective of most accelerated vehicle retirement programs,
and also of the Swedish permanent scrappage premium, is to reduce vehicle
emissions. Thus, we would like to translate the ﬁndings in the previous
sections of this paper into net changes in such emissions. This is no simple
task. However, we may draw some conclusions, at least with regard to which
factors need to be taken into account. It turns out that both in the case of a
temporary scrappage premium and in the case of a permanent premium, the
eﬀects on emissions will be ambiguous. In the last paragraphs of this section,
we will consider which factors would need to enter a social cost and beneﬁt
analysis of an accelerated scrappage program, and discuss what lessons this
would provide for the implementation of the ELV-directive.
Let us ﬁrst consider a permanent scrappage premium. Theoretically, a
higher scrappage premium will reduce the optimal life length of automobiles,
a n dt h i sw i l lt e n dt or e d u c ee m i s s i o n s .H o w e v e r ,t h es i z eo ft h ec a rp a r cw i l l
be increased, and this will tend to increase emissions. It is not a foregone
conclusion which eﬀect will dominate. Rather, whether the net eﬀect will
be positive or negative will depend on how the emission characteristics vary
over the life of the automobile, and on the pace of technological progress.8
Thus, if technological development is rapid, or if emission properties deterio-
rate rapidly towards the end of a car’s life, then it may be justiﬁable to have
policies designed to reduce the life length of automobiles. Instead of using a
scrappage premium, however, we may adjust the ratio between the registra-
tion tax and the road tax to inﬂuence the life length of automobiles. Given
8Naturally, it will also depend on the functions determining the optimal life length and
t h es i z eo ft h ec a rp a r k .
24the total burden of taxation on cars, if a larger share of the tax revenues is
obtained through a registration tax, the car owners will wait longer until they
buy a new car. Another policy alternative may be to diﬀerentiate the road
tax according to the age of the car. Naturally, other measures than taxes
and subsidies may also be used to purge the car parc of highly polluting old
automobiles. Such measures might include compulsory vehicle inspection, or
more stringent technical requirements for automobiles.
Our empirical ﬁndings also argue against the use of a scrappage premium
to try to inﬂuence the life-length of automobiles. It appears that the main
eﬀect of changes to the scrappage premium are only temporary, at least when
the premium is comparatively small, as it is in the Swedish case.
Obviously, the ”deposit-refund motive”, i.e. the use of a scrappage pre-
mium to give a disincentive to uncontrolled, and illegal, scrappage of cars
in forests and lakes, etc., is a separate issue. This issue is thoroughly ana-
lyzed by Bohm[7]. His ﬁndings indicate that on this measure, the Swedish
scrappage premium system has been successful, at least in the ﬁrst years of
operation. Later on, when the real value of the premium was allowed to fall,
due to inﬂation, the problem with abandoned cars reappeared, which further
vindicates that the scrappage premium system worked.
Let us now discuss an ”accelerated vehicle retirement program”, such as
the programs discussed in the introduction, under which a temporary scrap-
page premium is paid, and assume for the moment that it is introduced
completely unexpectedly. Thus, we need not consider delayed scrapped cars.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the oldest cars in the car park would then be
scrapped as soon as, or at least shortly after, the temporary scrappage pre-
mium is introduced. These cars would then instantly, or almost instantly, be
replaced by new cars. The reduction in emissions will thus be the diﬀerence
between the emissions from the scrapped cars and from the new cars. Note,
however, that if the emission properties of the automobiles deteriorate with
the age of the cars, but are constant over time for cars of the same age, then
total emissions over a car’s life span will be the same. Thus, the size of the
beneﬁts would depend on how future emissions are discounted. If, on the
other hand, emission properties of automobiles are improved over time, also
given the car’s age, then the emissions reduction will be permanent. How-
ever, after the scrappage premium has been abolished, and until the oldest
cars that were not scrapped under the accelerated scrappage program reach
their optimal life length, and are scrapped, no new cars will be sold, and no
old cars scrapped. (Remember that the optimal life length of automobiles
25as well as the size of the car stock are unaﬀected by a temporary scrappage
premium.) This will tend to counteract the initial reduction in emissions, as
automobile emissions will increase, or at least not decrease during this period.
Had the temporary scrappage premium not been introduced, on the other
hand, automobile emissions would have been reduced during this period due
to technological improvements in new cars. The net eﬀect on emissions seen
over a longer period of time will thus be uncertain, and will depend not only
on the pace of technological development, but also on whether the pace of
technological development is relatively constant, or if it takes place by leaps.
If technology develops by leaps, then the gain from getting rid of old pol-
luting cars, after such a leap has taken place, may be large. If no major
changes in technology take place in the period shortly after the accelerated
scrappage program is abolished, then the counteracting increase in pollution
may be small. The introduction of catalytic converters may be an example
of such a ”leap” in technology. Naturally, the same reasoning can be applied
to technological advances that improve the safety of automobiles.
As we have discussed above, it is usually not realistic to think that a
scrappage premium can be introduced unexpectedly. Suppose instead, and
more realistically, that it is anticipated some time beforehand. We then
need to consider car owners who delay scrapping their cars. If these cars
are just kept in a parking lot, and not used, they will have no eﬀect on
emissions. If, however, they are used, perhaps because the automobile owner
waits to buy a new car until the old one is scrapped, or as a second car,
then this will have an oﬀ-setting eﬀect on any emissions reduction. The
number of delayed scrapped cars may perhaps be reduced by introducing
more stringent requirements for an automobile to be eligible to receive the
premium. However, that may induce car owners to take costly action to
make the car eligible, e.g. by repairing it, thus increasing the social cost
of delayed scrapped cars. From the inequality in (22) we know, however,
that the number of delayed scrapped cars will decrease if the road tax is
increased. Thus, if the road tax is increased when the scrappage premium
b e c o m e sk n o w n ,o rs o m et i m eb e f o r ei ti si m p l e m e n t e d ,t h e nt h i sp r o b l e m
may be mitigated.
Making a social cost and beneﬁt analysis of an accelerated vehicle retire-
ment program or of a permanent scrappage premium must obviously involve
an assessment of the net eﬀect on emissions. Such an assessment would re-
quire assumptions about how technological development will aﬀect speciﬁc
emissions, as well as of how the age composition of the vehicle stock would
26evolve with and without a scrappage premium. When a scrappage premium
is introduced, we need to take account of delayed scrapped cars. Also, the
cost incurred by a car owner (excluding taxes) of keeping the car until it
is scrapped must be included in a cost and beneﬁt analysis. In addition,
the payment of a scrappage premium to car owners who would anyway have
scrapped their cars will constitute a redistribution of resources, which may
be unwarranted. If the accelerated scrappage program is publicly funded,
and if the social cost of public funds is larger than unity, this redistribution
will also give rise to a net social cost.
In addition, it must once more be pointed out that the additional envi-
ronmental costs that arise due to the increased number of scrapped cars, and
increased automobile production, must be included in the analysis. It is not
certain that even a ”successful” accelerated vehicle retirement program will
improve the environment.
Based on theoretical consideration, the ELV Directive could cause an in-
crease in the life-length of automobiles, at least under some of the policy
options possible to implement so called ”free” take-back of automobiles. As
pointed out to in the introduction, the point of the Directive is to increase
recycling of used cars beyond what is privately proﬁtable. This cost is im-
posed on the producers and importers of cars, and will be shifted over to
t h ec o n s u m e r s . I ti sn a ï v et oad e g r e et ot h i n kb e l i e v et h a tt h eD i r e c t i v e ’ s
stipulation that ”producers meet all, or a signiﬁcant part of, the cost of im-
plementing these measures” will have any eﬀect on where the eventual cost
of the policy falls. A plausible scenario is that prices of new cars will rise
to cover the extra cost imposed by the Directive. Possibly, auto makers will
have to oﬀer some kind of incentive to owners of ELV:s to make sure that
they will dispose of their cars properly, and not just leave them by the side of
the road, or dump them in a lake. Thus, it is not unreasonable to think that
something similar to the Swedish scrappage premium system will result. We
have seen that this would, theoretically lead to an increase in the optimal
life-length of automobiles. A ”Danish system”, however, where the extra
cost is instead paid as an annual levy, will not have this eﬀect. Rather, the
Danish system may reduce the life length of automobiles, since the premium
paid for scrapped cars is, at least at the present time, larger than the cost
of scrapping the car. At the same time, we would expect any system that
increases the cost of buying and owning a car to reduce the size of the car
parc. The empirical analysis, however, indicates that the eﬀects will not be
that large, if at all noticeable, provided of course, that the ELV Directive
27does not increase costs drastically.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
As have already been emphasized, this paper abstract from some complica-
tions in specifying the econometric model. The theoretical model also ignores
some complications. Two important simpliﬁcations is that the supply of cars
is not modelled, and that the market for scrapped cars is not included in
the analysis at all. Let us ﬁrst consider the supply of automobiles. The
model in this paper predicts that a temporary scrappage premium would
lead to a large temporary increase in the demand for new cars, followed by
a sharp reduction in demand, before normal conditions return. Such swings
in demand may aﬀect prices, if demand is not perfectly elastic, and also
industry proﬁts, if some form of imperfect competition prevails. Whether
proﬁts will increase or decrease depends on market conditions. However, the
fact that the automobile industry in several countries has lobbied in favor of
introducing ”accelerated vehicle scrappage programs” may indicate that the
industry’s representatives, at least, expect the eﬀect to be positive.9 We have
also implicitly assumed that all taxes are fully shifted over to consumers. In
practice, the price increase may be both larger and smaller than the tax
change, depending on the market structure.
I n t e r a c t i o nw i t ht h em a r k e tf o rs c r a p p e dc a r sm a ya l s oa ﬀect our results.
Many parts of a discarded automobile have a market value. However, a sharp
increase in the number of automobiles scrapped is likely to aﬀect the price
of used parts and of scrap metal. This is in fact one reason why the initially
successful Swedish deposit-refund system failed to achieve its objective after
a few years of operation. The price of scrap metal fell from SEK 130 per
ton in 1975 to SEK -20 per ton in 1978, i.e. the scrappage ﬁrms had to
pay to get rid of scrap metal.[7] Thus, eﬀe c t so nt h i sm a r k e ta r el i k e l yt o
have important consequences for the success of a scrappage program. An
exhaustive investigation into the eﬀects of an accelerated vehicle retirement
program would thus need to consider the supply of automobiles and the
demand for scrapped cars. This also has implications for the implementation
9It is easy to show that if the price is unchanged, and the proﬁt margin is not aﬀected,
then industry proﬁts will increase in the model used in this paper. Since the automobile
stock will be unchanged, we will in eﬀect move some car sales closer in time by introducing
a temporary scrappage premium, thus increasing the net present value of proﬁts.
28of the ELV Directive. It is not obvious how the car dismantling and recycling
industry will respond to the legislative changes brought by the Directive.
The treatment also ignores that cars sold today and cars sold ten years
ago are quite diﬀerent from each other. To take two instances, the average
engine power of cars sold in Sweden in 2001 was 25 percent larger than in
1991. During the same period, the market share of four by four vehicles had
increased from 1.9 percent of sold cars to 7.3 percent.[4] Obviously, technical
progress is one driving force behind changes to the car parc. It should,
however, be straight-forward to incorporate these complications within the
framework presented in the theoretical section of this paper.
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31Table 1 - The number of scrapped cars
Dependent Variable: Scrapped cars (1st diff)
Sample(adjusted): 1989:04 2001:12
Included observations: 153 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant -254.7 136.4 *
GDP (2nd diff) -0.01890 0.01542
Price index, car (2nd diff) 3248 3434
Price index, car ownership (1st diff) 4127 9141
Real interest rate (1st diff) -16767 22670
Base scrappage premium (1st diff) 215.2 56.02 ***
Extra scrappage premium (1st diff) 39.97 0.7908 ***
Base scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) 381.6 60.62 ***
Extra scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) 22.60 1.105 ***
Base scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) -57.47 47.91
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) -17.61 1.103 ***
Base scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -233.0 45.30 ***
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -7.659 0.9308 ***
AR(1) -1.154 0.005693 ***





Note: One, two and three asterisks denotes that the linear combination of 
parameters is significantly different from zero at, respectively, the 10-, 5- and 1-
percent level.Table 2 - Sold cars
Dependent Variable: Sold cars (1st diff.)
Sample: 1989:01 2001:12
Included observations: 156
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant 108.0 196.2
GDP (2nd diff) 0.02668 0.04224
Price index, car (2nd diff) -2938 4649
Price index, car ownership (1st diff) -4196 8542
Real interest rate (1st diff) 11977 20051
Base scrappage premium (1st diff) -73.79 65.87
Extra scrappage premium (1st diff) -2.288 1.314 *
Base scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) 61.57 65.63
Extra scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) 3.987 1.166 ***
Base scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) 178.6 58.68 ***
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) -0.1953 1.958
Base scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -148.1 58.06 **
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -8.301 1.565 ***
AR(12) 0.4864 0.07741 ***





Note: One, two and three asterisks denotes that the linear combination of 
parameters is significantly different from zero at, respectively, the 10-, 5- and 1-
percent level.Table 3 - Size of the car parc
Dependent Variable: Cars in use (2nd diff.)
Sample: 1989:01 2001:12
Included observations: 156
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant 182.6 192.1
GDP (2nd diff) 0.1381 0.07956 *
Price index, car (2nd diff) -6117 10012
Price index, car ownership (1st diff) -19080 10837 *
Real interest rate (1st diff) 23434 25998
Base scrappage premium (1st diff) -182.5 195.4
Extra scrappage premium (1st diff) -15.42 6.008 **
Base scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) 186.7 191.0
Extra scrappage premium (abs. value, 1st diff) -2.842 6.076
Base scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) 283.1 178.7
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, 1st diff) 3.626 6.242
Base scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -277.3 185.3
Extra scrappage premium (lagged, abs. value, 1st diff) -6.282 6.480
AR(12) 0.6353 0.09001 ***
MA(1) -0.8632 0.06012 ***
R-squared 0.4983
Adjusted R-squared 0.4485
Note: One, two and three asterisks denotes that the linear combination of 
parameters is significantly different from zero at, respectively, the 10-, 5- and 1-
percent level.Table 4 - Linear combinations of parameters
Scrappage Sales Car stock
Increase in the base scrappage premium 596.8 *** -12.21 4.188
Increase in the extra scrappage premium 62.57 *** 1.700 -18.26 *
Lagged increase in the base scrappage premium -290.5 *** 30.54 *** 5.841
Lagged increase in the extra scrappage premium -25.26 *** -8.496 *** -2.656
Reduction of the base scrappage premium -166.4 -135.4 -369.2
Reduction of the extra scrappage premium 17.37 *** -6.275 *** -12.58 **
Lagged reduction of the base scrappage premium 175.5 * 326.8 *** 560.4
Lagged reduction of the extra scrappage premium -9.947 *** 8.105 *** 9.908
Total effect, increase in the base premium 306.3 *** 18.33 10.03
Total effect, increase in the extra premium 37.30 *** -6.796 * -20.92 ***
Total effect, reduction of the base premium 9.106 191.4 191.2
Total effect, reduction of the extra premium 7.424 *** 1.830 -2.669
Note: One, two and three asterisks denotes that the linear combination of parameters is significantly 
different from zero at, respectively, the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level.